Georgia Natural Wonder #137 - Kolb's Farm - Loop & Battle. 963

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Georgia Natural Wonder #137 - Kolb's Farm - Loop & Battle

Four more post on this Classic South to Mountains theme on our Natural Wonders Forum. We stay in Cobb County and recount the two biggest Civil War Battlefields in our next two post.It turned out to be a Message Too Large for me to post about both Battles in one Post so I separate them. We have long since merged Nature and History in our post. The nature may be a little weak but the History is strong on this post.

Kolb's Farm - Loop & Battle

In keeping with my Natural Wonder theme, there is the Kolb's Farm Loop Trail. It is a 5.2 mile moderately trafficked loop trail located near Marietta, Georgia that features beautiful wild flowers and is good for all skill levels.



The trail offers a number of activity options and is accessible year-round.



It is pretty neat for Cobb County.



Dogs are also able to use this trail but must be kept on leash.



At the intersection of Powder Springs Road and Cheatham Hill Road sits the Kolb farmhouse. From where this picture is taken the Federal lines are about a quarter of a mile ahead on a ridge that now holds a Kroger and some subdivisions. Just to the right is war-time Powder Springs Rd. The 14th KY and the 123rd NY were posted here as skirmisher\pickets and were driven in by the assault. The house was renovated to its war-time appearance in 1964 and up until the failing economy housed a Park Ranger. Today it is vacant but the grounds are tended to.



Peter Valentine Kolb II built the farmhouse in 1836 and is a 'dog-trot' cabin that would have been very common in the area even during the war. Peter died in 1863 almost 6 months before the battle. His wife Eliza Gantt Kolb continued to live here with a family. The house features two sets of double chimneys. Referred to as Kulp's Farm in some Union dispatches, it was used by Hooker as Headquarters after the battle.



A few feet south of the road is a small parking lot with historical markers. From this parking lot you can view the home.



Kolb's Farmhouse is on Powder Springs Road across from Cheatham Hill Road. Here, interpretive signs discuss the battle and a map gives an overview of the attack.



Carefully cross Powder Springs Road and the path climbs a set of stone steps and crosses into a field.



The battlefield is mostly preserved except for the lines of the Federals.



The land on which the Confederates advanced is preserved but does not resemble at all the farmland with creeks cutting through it which was the landscape during the battle.



Today it is typical Georgia open forest, pine thickets, and the occasional grassy field.



Reviewers say

Good well marked trail. If you get there right at sunset you will see a lot of deer and other wildlife.



In the summer the trail will probably have a nice canopy with the trees.



World of 2 trails. One was pretty and tranquil, the other was full of horses, horse poop, houses seen through the trees, and walking near a road.



Battle Kolb’s Farm



We start with the details of the battle as Johnston writes Wheeler.

JUNE 21, 1864-8 a.m.
Major-General WHEELER:

GENERAL: I enclose a report in relation to the enemy's left, in the hope that it offers such an opportunity as that which you used so well yesterday. Please examine. It has been necessary to remove General Hood's troops, so that I must depend on you to hold the right. General Hood's entrenchments are vacant. Would it be well to put one of your brigades into them now? If the cavalry mentioned in the report is exposed so that you can act against it, the occupation of the entrenchments might be postponed. I expected Humes to return to you yesterday, but General Jackson took him on a long expedition. I believe, however, that their main cavalry force is on Jackson's front. I want to put a reserve of a brigade during the day in rear of the gap in Kennesaw, and shall be obliged to draw on you for it.

Respectfully, &c., J. E. JOHNSTON.


Hood's trenches atop Brushy Mountain. John Bell Hood.

There was evidently a pretty good skirmish along present day Canton Highway on June 21, 1864. It was on the far left of the Union line and the far right of the Confederate line………….

Rebel report.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, June 21, 1864.
General B. BRAGG, Richmond:

The situation is not essentially changed since my last dispatch. The enemy are apparently strengthening and extending their right on a line running generally north and south. On our right Wheeler yesterday, with 1,100 cavalry from Allen's, Anderson's, and Williams' brigades, Harrison's regiment, and a battery of artillery, attacked Garrard's division of cavalry; drove it from the field, killing 30 or 40, capturing as many more. The continued heavy rain has made the roads almost impassable. Military operations off them next to impossible.

J. E. JOHNSTON.


Joseph "Fighting Joe" Wheeler Always worth a tangent link.

Yankee Report.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION, June 21, 1864.
Major-General McPHERSON, Commanding Army of the Tennessee:

GENERAL: I have to report that instructions from General Sherman require me to interpose between the main rebel cavalry and the portion reported to have gone north of the Etowah to interfere with railroad communication. I have crossed the Noonday four times and attacked the enemy five times since I have been on this flank. I have not only found the enemy in good position, but have always found him strong. Observation of their movements also indicates that they are in force. In an open field or where I could bring my whole division into action after gaining a knowledge of the locality, I can take care of myself, but where they are in position and stronger than I am, it is quite a different matter. Unless otherwise directed I propose to move in the morning. I was prevented from doing so to-day on account of my wounded and dead who required to be cared for. My loss yesterday was 65. The enemy left in front of my line 10 dead; and a wounded man who was a prisoner in their hands last night reports seeing large numbers of their wounded and dead brought in. He says their dead was 100, but this is no doubt exaggerated, though I think from 40 to 50 killed would be in limits. Some of the heaviest fighting was out half a mile in front in supporting the pickets. As I only held my line, the rebels had that portion of the field and were most of the night occupied in getting off their wounded and dead. A lieutenant of the rebel cavalry told this man two divisions made the attack, and that they met with the heaviest loss that they ever had experienced. 

I merely speak of these matters to try to show that there is a large force of cavalry here, and that they feel strong enough to attack, and attack with vigor and boldness. This attack of the enemy was of course brought on by my advance. My pickets are at Bob McAfee's, and the fight was on the Marietta and Canton road. The camps of the enemy lie northeast and east of me. Out of the 65 lost all can be accounted for expect about 10, who are supposed captured in our charge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

K. GARRARD, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.


Kenner Garrard Another tangent link.

William Tecumseh Sherman, of course, wanted to attack - he lived for the advance. But if a position could be taken by maneuver, for the sake of the lives of his men, he was bound to at least attempt it. Joe Johnston's position on Kennesaw Mountain was strong, "unusually strong," as Sherman put it. But it was not impossibly so. The Confederate left wasn't exactly dangling along Noyes Creek, but there was something close to certainty in Sherman that believed it could be turned.


Noyes Creek.

Then there was his own left, holding close to the railroad. There, the Army of the Tennessee, hemmed by James McPherson, clung to their entrenchments. It had become a terrifying tedium of potshots, small skirmishing and artillery fire. On McPherson's left, the Rebel cavalry operated, and while they were usually kept busy by their Union counterparts, there was always the chance that they could slip beyond McPherson and fall upon the supply lines.


View on the battlefields of Kennesaw. Taken from Pigeon Hill, can see Nodine's Hill in distance.

If he could, Sherman would maneuver. But this ground, covered in boulders, underbrush, tangles, and forest, interspersed at random with farm lots, was unkind to the notion. The Confederate left was the focus, as the center was well anchored atop Kennesaw Mountain, and the right was on Brushy Mountain Ridge. And even though it was maneuver, there would have to be blood. Blood was compulsory.



For the past month, so was the rain. Everything was wet and muddy and there seemed to be no end any could imagine. But the rains might also be cover. To this end, Sherman wished to push his right flank south with John Schofield's Army of the Ohio, augmented by Joe Hooker's Twentieth Corps.



Late, on the Union right, General Sherman rode to John Schofield's headquarters to discuss crossing Noyes Creek, separating the two flanks, and driving in the Rebel left. But before long, Johnston would take notice and extend his lines with John Bell Hood's Corps (Who came over from Brushy Mountain), and though there would be attempts and skirmishes, there would be no Federal success in the hard days to come.

6/22/1864 - Battle Kolb’s Farm

The Battle of Kolb's Farm was fought on June 22, 1864, between Union forces under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and Confederate forces under Lt. Gen. John B. Hood. Hood attempted an attack on the Union force, but poor terrain conditions led to its failure.


Kolb's Farm then.


Kolb's Farm today.

After the Confederate Army of Tennessee, under General Joseph E. Johnston, had settled into the Kennesaw line, consisting principally of the twin elevations of Big Kennesaw Mountain and Little Kennesaw Mountain, on June 19, the pursuing Federal forces under Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman began to probe this new line in search of weak spots. After judging the Kennesaw line to be too strong to take by regular assault - even though he would attempt to do just that five days later - Sherman decided to fix Johnston's line in place with his left wing, the Army of the Tennessee, under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, while maneuvering his center and left wing, the Army of the Cumberland, under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, into position to turn Johnston's left flank somewhere south of the Powder Springs Road. In obedience to Sherman's orders, Thomas moved the XX Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, into the area; Hooker would be supported in this operation by the single-corps Army of the Ohio, under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, who would guard Hooker's far right.



Johnston correctly anticipated Sherman's movements, and decided to counter them by moving one of his three corps, under Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, from its reserve position near Marietta south and west along Powder Springs Road to the vicinity of Mt. Zion Church; this would both extend his left and counter Sherman's turning movement. Hood was ordered to pull out of line on June 20 and began the movement on the morning of June 21. His corps passed through Marietta and was in place by June 22.



During the early afternoon of June 22, Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, commanding one of Hood's divisions, advanced his division from its campsite near Mt. Zion Church towards Kolb's Farm, which lay on the south side of the Powder Springs Road.



Stevenson reported heavy skirmish fire from what turned out to be two Federal regiments, the 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry. Shortly afterward, Hood ordered his entire corps - the divisions of Stevenson, Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, and Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman to advance west along the Powder Springs Road, driving the Federals before them. Apparently Hood believed one of two things: 1) he had passed beyond the Federals' far right flank and was in an excellent position to "roll them up" by attacking west and then north or 2) that the Federal troops in the area were deployed in marching columns and were thus vulnerable to attack. Confederate cavalry forces in the area reported the presence of considerable Federal infantry in the area, not just the two outpost regiments encountered by Stevenson, but this information did not reach Hood in time; nor, given Hood's penchant for aggressive action, is it likely that this information would have changed his mind even if he had received it in a more timely fashion.



Hood's corps was deployed with Stevenson's division astride the Powder Springs Road (two brigades north of it and two brigades south of it) and Hindman's north of it; Stewart's division remained behind Stevenson's to provide support if needed. Hood's entire corps, including artillery, numbered around 14,000 men.



On the Federal side, Hooker had received prior warning of Hood's advance, and had begun to entrench his corps in order to receive it. Like Hood, Hooker's XX Corps consisted of three divisions, under Maj. Generals John W. Geary, Alpheus S. Williams, and Daniel Butterfield. Williams's division was placed astride of the Powder Springs Road, and thus would receive the brunt of the coming attack. Geary's division was positioned on Williams's left, and Butterfield's division was on Geary's left, in reserve. Hooker's total force numbered around 15,000 men.


Battle of Kolb's Farm Marker. The main attack was around this marker off Cheatham Hill Road.


Looking south on Cheatham Hill Road toward Kolb's Farm.


Looking north.


The Confederate attack came from this east to west direction. Difficult to mark and traverse this battlefield.

Hood launched his attack sometime after 5:00 p.m. The 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry, still on picket duty, received the weight of this initial attack and fell back, although in the process they managed to inflict considerable damage on Stevenson's division, particularly its two leftmost brigades under the commands of Brigadier Generals Alfred Cumming and Edmund Pettus.



Consequently, these two brigades were forced to pause after driving back the Federal skirmishers, and thus took no part in the coming attack. 



As the other half of Stevenson's division emerged from the woods north of the road where it had begun its advance into the more open area around Kolb's Farm, Federal artillery cut into it.



There was Union artillery all up Cheatham Hill Road and the Loop Trail.



Stevenson was forced to withdraw; his division had suffered too many casualties and too much disorganization during its advance. Falling back to a position near a ravine, which was unfortunately caught in an enfilade fire from Federal artillery, resulting in even greater losses, Stevenson held on until nightfall then withdrew east.



The Boy Scouts have placed some signs along the path marking troop positions. There aren't many but hopefully more will be added. The Union gun emplacement can be seen in the background.



A New York Herald reporter said,
"Along the little stream ran a rail fence. The rebels had crowded behind this for protection, but were literally mowed down. The torn, bloody knapsacks, haversacks, and frequent pools of blood were ghastly evidences of how they suffered. The stream was choked up with bodies and discolored with blood."





Trail flooded by creek sometimes.



Meanwhile, Hindman's attack fared even worse; a patch of marshy ground in the area complicated his advance, and he was forced to withdraw after sustaining heavy casualties from Federal artillery.



According to Williams' account, Hindman's division was repulsed by artillery alone, Williams's infantry having taken no part in the fighting in that area.


Passing over the creek the land settles into a floodplain that was once the Kolb farmland. The Confederate advance was from left to right and in this area Alabamians, Mississippians, and South Carolinians of Hindman's brigade surged forward.


The Blue dot illustrates where that last image was taken.


Continuing south along the path the Federals were dug in along a low ridge to the right that was too full of foliage to get a decent picture. There are subdivision houses lining the ridge about 100 yards to the right.


Up out of the floodplain the forest returns. This area was still farmland in 1864. From this shot Brown's Tennesseans and Cumming's Georgians are coming straight at you and the Federal lines are about 150 yards behind you. There would have been massive casualties here from rifle and canister.


 
Total Confederate casualties in the battle, which one historian referred to as "more a one-sided slaughter than a battle" were approximately 1,500 men. Of this amount, two-thirds were suffered by Stevenson's division alone. The Federals suffered less than a third of that number, around 250 casualties, with many of them coming in the 123rd New York (48 casualties) and the 14th Kentucky (70 casualties).



Meanwhile at the Wallis House on June 22 that Sherman first learned of Hood's attack on Hooker's Corps at the Kolb Farm House three miles south. Surprised by the attack, thinking Hood still at Brushy Mountain, Sherman was further confounded and angered by Hooker's claim that the "entire Confederate army was in his front." Hood's corps had been quietly withdrawn from Brushy Mountain the night before to a point ten miles south on the Powder Springs Road - a major road approaching Marietta along a ridge from the southwest.



HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH CORPS, Near Kolb's House, Ga., June 22, 1864-12 p. m.
Brigadier-General WHIPPLE, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the operations of the Twentieth Corps commenced with throwing forward Geary's division and driving away the rebels from some commanding heights about a mile in advance of my center. When this was accomplished batteries were posted to sweep the ground to the left to enable Butterfield to advance about the same distance and take possession of some wooded heights, which were held by the enemy, as it was believed that the possession of them would give us command of the Dallas and Marietta road, and that in rear of the enemy in front of the fourth Corps. Meanwhile Williams threw forward his right flank, driving the enemy before him, step by step, between two and three miles to the Kolb house, on the Powder Springs and Marietta road, his left connecting with Geary. This was the position of the corps at 2 o'clock. Soon after Hascall's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, came up on the Powder Springs road, and as it was yet early and effort was made to push the right still farther forward on the last-named road, as it was thought some advantage would be gained by establishing ourselves on some high ground beyond. General Knipe threw forward a force on the road, and also skirmishers on the left, while Major-General Schofield advanced a similar column from the Twenty-third Corps on the right. Before advancing far they encountered the enemy in force, and in order to gain time to establish our lines and batteries the advanced troops were instructed to make a resolute defense, and only abandon their position when overcome by superior numbers. 

About 4.30 p. m. the enemy had deployed his lines and commenced throwing his masses forward with great violence on our right and center, which was madly persisted in until after sundown. As often as he made his assaults he was spiritedly repulsed, sometimes with his columns hopelessly broken and demoralized. Our artillery did splendid execution among them. At this hour I have no means of estimating his loss or my own. The enemy's must be severe; ours inconsiderable for the number of men engaged and the heavy blow they gave to the enemy. After his troops were routed it was my desire to pursue, but the smallness of my force available for the service would not justify the movement. The conduct of the troops throughout the day was sublime.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General, Commanding.


Joseph Hooker. Origin of slang term for prostitute?

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, June 22, 1864-9 p. m.
Major General W. T. SHERMAN,Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: I have pushed forward on the Marietta road until I connect with General Hooker's right, which is considerably in advance of the rest of his line. The fighting has been heavy during most of the afternoon and has been decidedly to our advantage. Prisoners say we are only a mile and a half from the railroad. General Hooker says we are a little in advance of Kolb's. I have one brigade on the Sandtown road and my cavalry covers the interval. I regard my hold of that road as secure. Prisoners say the whole of Hood's corps left their right and came this side of Marietta yesterday. They made an assault upon me and also upon Hooker this evening with the evident purpose of breaking our lines, yet their assaults were hardly strong enough for the force named. Prisoners all agree that Hood's whole corps was in our front to-day, and do not know that any force but cavalry took their place on the enemy's right. My loss is about 100, that of the enemy much larger. We have taken about 50 prisoners.

Very respectfully, 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General, Commanding.


John McAllister Schofield

Hood's reputation at Kolb's Farm was diminished with Johnston as had Hooker's been with Sherman. Hood's two-division attack was unauthorized by Johnston. The primary purpose for the displacement from Brushy Mountain was to keep pace with Sherman's flanking movements, not to launch an attack. Hood's effort by Stevenson's and Hindman's divisions gained some initial success but no permanent advantage. Hindman's men, trapped in an artillery crossfire, suffered the majority of the 1,000 Confederate casualties.



Hood claimed victory. Visiting the field the next morning, General Johnston knew otherwise.



6/23/1864

Nearly 60 men laid dead on the part of the Kolb Farm Battle in front of Gallup's cannons where Stevenson's charge took place yesterday off present day John Ward Road. Gallup had been ordered to retire to the principal line when hard pressed, but stimulated by the terrible effect of their own volleys upon the advancing enemy, and not realizing that his flanks would soon be turned, his men held on till peremptory orders were given for him to retire. 



Hood's attacks were so determined and persistent and they seem to have been made upon his own responsibility. He evidently hoped that he could out flank the National army on that side, and by catching them in motion by columns, could gain some decided advantage. That he was disappointed does not detract from the good generalship of the effort. He found at every point an array of men every way equal to his own in courage and self - reliance, and handled with intelligent skill. 


Hood and Hooker at Kolb's Farm in the shadow of Kennesaw Mountain.

June 24, 1864.

General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond:

Lieutenant-General Hood, on our left, reports that, being attacked on the afternoon of the 22d, he drove back the enemy, taking one entire line of his breast-works. The pursuit was stopped by exposure to fire of fixed batteries. Stevenson's division mainly engaged; Hindman's slightly. Brisk skirmishing on Hardee's front much of the day yesterday, and a good deal of cannonading on Loring's.

J. E. JOHNSTON.


Pretty good little hike with some markers of action.

The battle demonstrated Hood's main deficiency as a battlefield commander: his willingness to attack without adequate reconnaissance. He would go on to make the same error, this time as an army commander, at three future engagements in the Atlanta Campaign - the Battle of Peachtree Creek, the Battle of Atlanta, and the Battle of Ezra Church - with exceedingly costly results.



On the Federal side, the victory was marred by growing friction between Sherman and Hooker. Shortly after the last Confederate attack had ended, Sherman sent a message to Hooker asking for a status report. Hooker replied:

"We have repulsed two heavy attacks and feel confident, our only apprehension being our extreme right flank. Three entire corps are in front of us."

Sherman took offense to this reply, as did Schofield, for its implication that Schofield's corps had not been performing its duty as Hooker's right-flank guard. The next day, June 23, Sherman, Hooker and another officer - either Schofield or one of his subordinates, Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascall - had a meeting at a local church to discuss the merit of Hooker's claims. According to most sources, the meeting ended badly, with Sherman supposedly warning Hooker as he rode away that "such things must not occur again." This led to a steady decline in Hooker's standing with Sherman, which culminated the following month in Sherman's decision to promote Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, a junior officer whom Hooker disliked, into a senior position in command of Hooker. Hooker promptly tendered his resignation, which Sherman accepted.


Joseph Hooker Statue grounds of Massachusetts State Capital.

Although he lost many more men than the Union defenders Hood stopped the Union move to the south and forced Sherman into a frontal assault against the Confederate stronghold, Kennesaw Mountain.



Despite the victory, Sherman's intended turning movement had been checkmated, which forced him to consider other options for breaking Johnston's Kennesaw line, in the end leading him to order the large-scale assault on June 27. As at least one historian has pointed out, this checkmate had been achieved simply by moving Hood's corps into the general area of Kolb's Farm; no attack had been necessary. Nevertheless, an attack had been made, resulting in nothing more than unnecessary casualties for both sides.

Been working on Cobb County too long

In researching for my Cobb County GNW gals for today, I rediscovered that Corn Cobb only has one b.


Three Cob County Gals, one with a twosome.