Georgia Natural Wonder #192 - High Shoals Falls - Paulding County (Part 1). 1,006

[Top Row Dawg]

High Shoals Falls - Paulding County

We finished floating the Yellow River on the east side of Atlanta. We now travel to the far west side of Atlanta for our next post. We already posted about High Shoals Falls near Hiawassee with our post on Tray Mountain early in our explorations in GNW #13.


The real High Shoals Falls in Georgia. 

Until a few years ago I only knew of the High Shoals Falls near Helen. That is, until my daughter told me about this waterfall…in Dallas! A few months ago we visited and what a special treat!


TRD panoramic.

Don’t freak out when you get to the address. It’s an old graveyard with a parking lot in front large enough for about 4 cars.  You’ll see a trail that runs in front of the headstones.



The original church building was constructed about 1840 and was a one room cabin that sat on the east side of the old cemetery. It was originally called Hardshell Baptist Church. About 1880 a new Church was built which was also used as a school.



Follow that down, about 1/4 of a mile. You’ll hear the waterfall before you see it.



There is a picnic table, and plenty of creek in which to wade. The water in front of the falls is perfect for swimming, and you can climb to the top of the falls.  There is more stream up there, but not much trail before you hit private property. This is more of a “water play spot” and less “hiking spot” … but still a load of fun.


TRD panoramic.

The pool at the base of the falls was used as a baptism site for the nearby church.  The falls is easy to get to and the trail to it is very short.  We noticed that a brand new picnic table had recently been put in close to the falls.



According to GPMAPS this falls is on an unnamed creek that flows into Raccoon Creek.



The name of this waterfall is High Shoals Falls and is found in the heart of Paulding County. If you aren’t aware Paulding is the county directly west of Cobb County. The waterfall itself is a 10 minute drive north from downtown Dallas. From Dallas you have about a 30 minute drive to back towards Marietta.



I arrived at the cemetery mentioned in the directions and where I was supposed to park my car.



The area was small, for like maybe 4 or 5 cars. There was a sign showing the park hours. I grabbed my gear, my dog Sally, and headed down the trail.



The trail was a short 200 or 300 yards down the trail. The area is very unassuming and quiet.  You can hear the waterfall not far after you start down the trail. Once you arrive the waterfall faces you on the trail and makes for a really nice scene. The first picture above is what you see as you arrive.



What is really cool about this waterfall is that it is so out of the way, and so unknown, that chances are you will have the place to yourself. The flow of the creek and shape of the contours of the land are seemingly perfect for shots from either side of the creek that flows down from the waterfall. The rock face that the falls tumble over create a small amphitheater and climbing to the top of the falls from either side is relatively easy. The falls spill into a fairly shallow splash pool and give way to some small cascades just beyond the pool. Overall all I have to say this might be the most accessible waterfall I’ve ever been to. The only unfortunate thing about it I would say is that beyond this place there isn’t really anything else, waterfall related, beyond a good 30 to 45 minute drive.


Daughter and some dog at at sunset.

It was basically late morning (noon-ish) so the sun was nice and high in the sky. The panoramic above was from 3 frames, taken from left to right. My suggestion would be to hit this waterfall later in the day or early morning. If you live in the Atlanta area I would certainly recommend checking out this waterfall…. it is worth the out of the way trip.


Winter time hike too.

Paulding County Georgia

Paulding County is a county located in the northwestern part of the U.S. state of Georgia. Part of the Atlanta metropolitan area, it had an estimated population of 168,667 in 2019. The county seat is Dallas.





History

Paulding County was created from Cherokee County by an act of the Georgia General Assembly on December 3, 1832. In 1851, a portion of Paulding County was used to help create Polk County. Other portions of Paulding County were annexed to neighboring counties (Campbell, Carroll, Cobb, Douglas, Haralson, and Polk) between 1832 and 1874. Between 1850 and 1874, Paulding County was expanded through annexation of parts of Carroll, Cobb, Douglas, and Polk counties.



The county is named after John Paulding (October 16, 1758 – February 18, 1818), who was famous for the capture of the British spy Major John André in 1780 during the American Revolution. André was on a mission carrying secret papers from Benedict Arnold when he was captured.


Paulding and André.

Originally held by Creek Indians, the land was lost in battle to the Cherokee Nation in 1755. In turn the Cherokee lost the land to white settlers who arrived in the nineteenth century. Many of them came in response to the discovery of gold, with two veins running through what was to become Paulding County, in 1829.



There are 26 Gold Mines in Paulding County.



Upon this discovery the state broke all its treaties with the Cherokee and divided the land into forty-acre “Gold Lots,” which it distributed by lottery in 1832. Gold seekers migrated from other parts of Georgia and from other states. Many did not find gold but remained in the area to farm.



By 1840 agriculture was the primary occupation in Paulding County, followed by manufacturing and trades. Primary crops were corn, tobacco, and wheat, with some cotton. Non-farm enterprises included a number of gristmills, sawmills, potteries, and tanneries.



Today the county covers 313 square miles. There have been two county seats in the county’s history. The first, Van Wert, was created in 1833 and named after Issac Van Wart, one of John Paulding’s two companions in the arrest of Major Andre. Van Wert was in the part of Paulding County that went to Polk County.





Built in 1857, Van Wert Methodist Church is one of the oldest structures in the county. The Euharlee Valley Historic Society is currently renovating the structure, which was built by Reverend William Wesley Simpson.


The building survived the horrors of the Civil War, and the cemetery is the final resting place for the casualties of war.

The new county seat was named Dallas for George Mifflin Dallas, who had just finished serving as vice president in U.S. president James K. Polk’s administration.



Incorporated in 1854, Dallas has been home to several courthouses, the first described as resembling a shack, three miles from today’s city center. The next courthouse was built in the mid-1850s and was replaced by the current structure in 1892. Placed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1980, the current building has been renovated several times and was provided with a three-story annex in 1990.



Other incorporated cities in the county are Braswell and Hiram.



In  the months leading up to the Civil War (1861-65), Paulding County, largely rural and inhabited by a majority of nonslaveholding citizens, was a cooperationist county. After Georgia seceded, however, the county joined wholeheartedly in the Confederate cause. A large number of Paulding County men joined the Confederate forces, and both civilians and soldiers saw action in the county. Many of the county’s roads, following Indian trails that led from a spring near Dallas, radiated from the county seat to cities such as Atlanta and Marietta. Union general William T. Sherman planned to take possession of Dallas so that he could control the routes to and from these cities. Confederate general Joseph Johnston and his troops attempted to prevent Sherman from realizing his plans, resulting in three major encounters in Paulding County in May 1864: the battles of New Hope Church, Pickett’s Mill, and Dallas. These conflicts delayed the Union capture of Atlanta by at least a week.

Civil War

The Battle of New Hope Church (May 25–26, 1864) was a clash between the Union Army under Major General William T. Sherman and the Confederate Army of Tennessee led by General Joseph E. Johnston during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. Earlier in May, Sherman successfully maneuvered Johnston's army into retreating from three positions at Dalton, Resaca, and Cassville. However, when Sherman's army crossed the Etowah River and attempted to move around Johnston's left flank, the Confederate general was able to shift troops in time to block the move. At New Hope Church, the Union XX Corps under Joseph Hooker aggressively pressed forward but its attack received a stinging repulse by one division from John Bell Hood's Confederate corps.



Background

Armies

On April 30, Sherman's host numbered 110,000 soldiers of which 99,000 were available for "offensive purposes". All of the Union army's 254 guns consisted of 12-pounder Napoleons, 10-pounder Parrott rifles, 20-pounder Parrott rifles, and 3-inch Ordnance rifles. The 25,000 non-combatants accompanying the army included railroad employees and repair crews, teamsters, medical staff, and Black camp servants. Sherman directed elements of three armies. The Army of the Cumberland led by George H. Thomas counted 73,000 troops and 130 guns, the Army of the Tennessee under James B. McPherson numbered 24,500 soldiers and 96 guns, and the Army of the Ohio commanded by John Schofield had 11,362 infantry, 2,197 cavalry, and 28 guns.



Thomas' army consisted of the IV Corps under Oliver Otis Howard, the XIV Corps under John M. Palmer, the XX Corps under Joseph Hooker, and three cavalry divisions led by Edward M. McCook, Kenner Garrard, and Hugh Judson Kilpatrick. McPherson's army comprised the XV Corps under John A. Logan and the Left Wing of the XVI Corps under Grenville M. Dodge. Schofield's army was made up of the XXIII Corps under Schofield and a cavalry division led by George Stoneman. The IV and XX Corps each counted 20,000 soldiers, the XIV Corps had 22,000, the XV Corps totaled 11,500, and the XVI and XVII Corps each numbered about 10,000 men.


William T. Sherman

On April 30, Johnston's army counted 41,279 men present for duty in seven infantry divisions. There were 3,227 artillerymen present for duty serving 144 guns. Many of the guns were inferior to the Federal artillery pieces, but the crews were experienced. There were 10,000 cavalrymen, but only 8,500 present for duty and many horses were in poor condition. There were probably 8,000 non-combatants supporting the army, many of whom were disabled by wounds or otherwise unfit for combat. Johnston's Army of Tennessee included two infantry corps led by William J. Hardee and John Bell Hood, and a cavalry corps under Joseph Wheeler. The army was soon joined by the corps of Leonidas Polk and the cavalry division of William Hicks Jackson. Hardee's corps consisted of the divisions of Benjamin F. Cheatham, Patrick Cleburne, William H. T. Walker, and William B. Bate. Hood's corps included the divisions of Thomas C. Hindman, Carter L. Stevenson, and Alexander P. Stewart. Polk's corps comprised the divisions of William Wing Loring, Samuel Gibbs French, and James Cantey.


Joseph E. Johnston

Operations

Sherman launched his campaign on May 7, 1864 with the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge GNW #97 during which he turned Johnston's western flank.  This was followed by the Battle of Resaca on May 13–15 at which time Polk's corps began arriving. After Sherman turned his western flank again, Johnston withdrew. At the Battle of Adairsville GNW #162 , Johnston tried to strike at Sherman's army, but the opportunity was fumbled. On May 19, Polk and Hood convinced Johnston to retreat to Allatoona Pass GNW #155 - Later Battle. Johnston conducted the withdrawal south of the Etowah River skillfully, leaving few stragglers behind. Schofield's corps passed through Cartersville and reached the Etowah to find the bridges burnt and the Confederates gone. The Western and Atlantic Railroad ran through a gorge at Allatoona Pass and Johnston posted his army there in an extremely strong defensive position.



Sherman planned to force Johnston's army to retreat behind the Chattahoochee River. To do this he decided to outflank Johnston's army on the west by marching to Dallas and then Marietta. On May 20, Sherman ordered his army to be ready to move on May 23. Since it would be leaving the railroad line, the army carried 20 days of supplies in its wagons and evacuated all its wounded and unfit men to the rear. Sherman was anxious about his railroad supply line which ran 80 miles back to Chattanooga. Fearing the railroad might be damaged by Confederate cavalry raids, Sherman ordered John E. Smith's XV Corps division from Huntsville, Alabama and nine XXIII Corps regiments from East Tennessee and Kentucky forward to guard the Western and Atlantic Railroad. To replace these units, he summoned northern state governors to recruit 100-day regiments to garrison the rear area railroads.



Sherman directed McPherson's two corps on his right wing to march from Kingston south to Van Wert and then east to Dallas. Since Jefferson C. Davis division (XIV Corps) was already to the west at Rome, it moved with McPherson. Thomas' three corps were ordered to march south through Euharlee and Stilesboro toward Dallas. Garrard's cavalry covered McPherson's wing, while McCook's horsemen scouted ahead of Thomas's center. Preceded by Stoneman, Schofield's left wing marched from Cartersville to the Etowah. Stoneman's cavalry found Milam's Bridge burned and a pontoon bridge was laid nearby. Hooker crossed his XX Corps ahead of Schofield's XXIII Corps and therefore was able to move ahead of Thomas' other two corps.



Unsure if Sherman was moving around his left flank, Johnston ordered Wheeler's cavalry to cross to the north bank of the Etowah to see if Sherman's army was still there. On May 24 Wheeler reported that Sherman's army was to the west near Kingston. Avoiding Kilpatrick's cavalry, which was patrolling the area, Wheeler's horsemen captured 70 wagons and burned others. Also on May 24, McPherson reached a point 8 mi  west of Dallas. Riding ahead, Garrard's troopers reported that Confederate infantry was at Dallas. Hooker reached Burnt Hickory ahead of Thomas' other corps; Schofield's corps was to the northeast. Alerted by reports from Jackson's cavalry division, Johnston deduced that the Union army was maneuvering to turn his left flank. That afternoon, McCook's horsemen captured a Confederate courier with a message that Johnston's army was moving toward Dallas. Nevertheless, Sherman remained confident that Johnston would not try to block him at Dallas; he ordered his army to press forward.

TRD Explorations And Official Reports

12 p.m., received orders from Major-General Thomas to march the corps at 9 a.m. tomorrow for Dallas, following General Geary's and Williams' divisions, or on a road to the right, which may be pointed out in the morning; orders were sent at once to division commanders to march the next a.m.--Newton at 9 o'clock, Stanley at 9.30, and Wood at 10. Roads very dusty. Day pleasant. The country for the first three miles of our march to-day was very open and well cultivated, then we reached the hills, quite rough and covered with pine woods.



Looking north on Ga Highway 61, toward Cartersville. Marker is near Dallas, Georgia, in Paulding County. Marker is on Cartersville Highway (Georgia Route 61) .0 miles south of School Road, on the left when traveling north.





Marker is in Dallas, Georgia, in Paulding County. Marker is on Bobo Road near Hosiery Mill Road, on the right when traveling north. The marker is located in a small park with several other markers, at the edge of the New Hope Baptist Church parking lot.



Battle


The upper left part of this map shows Sherman's advance to New Hope Church.

On the morning of May 25, Hardee's corps took position at Dallas, blocking the road to Marietta, with Polk's corps on its right flank. On the far right flank, Hood's corps moved into position near New Hope Church, northeast of Dallas. Hood posted Hindman's division on the left flank and Stevenson's division on the right flank. Stewart's division deployed in the center, reinforced by one of Stevenson's brigades. Hood's soldiers immediately dug rifle pits and piled up breastworks of logs and rocks. Confederate observers on Elsberry Mountain reported seeing dust clouds that indicated Sherman's troops were coming. That afternoon, Hood's troops captured a Union soldier who admitted that he belonged to Hooker's corps.



On May 25, McPherson's left wing took the road southeast from Van Wert to Dallas. Davis' division turned off to the east on a side road. Hooker's XX Corps marched on the road from Burnt Hickory to Dallas, with John W. Geary's division on the main road. The other divisions advanced on minor roads, with Alpheus S. Williams to the right and Daniel Butterfield (The man who wrote Taps) to the left of the main road. The IV and XIV Corps marched to the right of Hooker's corps and Schofield's corps remained close to Burnt Hickory. At Pumpkinvine Creek, the Federals found some Confederates trying to set the bridge on fire. Hooker's cavalry escort drove off the bridge-burners and Geary's troops crossed the stream. At the left fork in the road near Owen's Mills, Geary's division took the route toward New Hope Church. As his column advanced, it was met by determined resistance by the 32nd Alabama and 58th Alabama Infantry Regiments and Austin's Sharpshooters under Bush Jones. Geary was compelled to deploy Charles Candy's brigade in an extended skirmish line in order to drive Jones' Confederates back.
.

Operations near New Hope Church map is from Jacob D. Cox's Atlanta.

Geary's troops took several prisoners who told them that Hood's corps was directly ahead. Both Thomas and Hooker were startled by this information because, like Sherman, they did not expect to run into major opposition so soon. Fearing that Geary's troops were exposed to a sudden attack, Thomas summoned the divisions of Williams and Butterfield to march rapidly to Geary's assistance. Having marched down the right fork toward Dallas, Williams' troops had to retrace their route to Owen's Mills, then turn right into the road Geary had taken. Between 4 pm and 5 pm, both Williams' and Butterfield's troops reinforced Geary. Still convinced that only minor Confederate forces were in the Dallas area, Sherman ordered Thomas to attack; Thomas passed the order to Hooker.


Hell Hole

Soon after 5 pm, Hooker gave the order to attack, with Williams' division on the right and Butterfield's division on the left and Geary's division in support. Butterfield's line was slightly behind Williams in order to protect against a flank attack. All three divisions were formed in columns of brigades. That is, within each division, each brigade was deployed in line, one behind the other. All three divisions advanced about 1 mi through dense woods and underbrush. In Williams' division, Hooker and Williams rode behind the first brigade. When the troops reached the bottom of a slope, they were greeted by a storm of rifle and artillery fire. The Union soldiers threw themselves to the ground behind whatever cover they could find and fired back. As they came under fire, Butterfield's and Geary's soldiers also lay down. The 4,000 Confederate defenders belonged to Stewart's division, with the brigades of Marcellus Augustus Stovall, Henry D. Clayton, and Alpheus Baker in the front line, from left to right, and Randall L. Gibson's brigade in reserve. Stewart's line was also supported by 16 cannons. Though facing 16,000 Federals, Stewart's entrenched soldiers had no trouble defending their position.



The Union generals hoped that their opponents would be caught in the open, but it became clear that the Confederates were protected by earth and log field fortifications. The only clearly visible target was a Confederate artillery battery, which took casualties. Williams' first brigade under James S. Robinson fired off its 60 rounds per man and was replaced in the battle line by Thomas H. Ruger's brigade. Joseph F. Knipe's brigade waited in the third line. Johnston, who arrived at Hood's headquarters that afternoon, asked Stewart if he needed reinforcements. Stewart replied, "My own troops will hold the position." The battle went on for three hours, and during the last hour a thunderstorm added its noise and rain to the din of battle. Hooker reported suffering 1,665 killed and wounded. The Union troops called the battlefield the "Hell Hole". As the defeated Federals slowly withdrew, the Confederates gave a cheer. Stewart reported losing 300–400 casualties. Another source stated there were 1,665 Union and 400 Confederate casualties.



TRD Explorations And Official Reports

The Battle of New Hope Church was fought May 25-26, 1864. After Johnston retreated to Allatoona Pass on May 19-20, Sherman decided that he would most likely pay dearly for attacking Johnston there, so he determined to move around Johnston's left flank and steal a march toward Dallas. After a few day's rest, the Union forces moved south. General Joseph Hooker was in the van of the middle column and began a pursuit of a small band of Confederate cavalry which was acting as a screen for Johnston's forces to the south.  Johnston anticipated Sherman's move and shifted his army into Sherman's path, centering a new line at New Hope Church. Sherman mistakenly surmised that Johnston had a token force and ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's XX Corps to attack. 



Atlanta Campaign---Battle of New Hope Church:  Gen. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee halts at New Hope Church, forming a line with Hood in the center, Polk on the left, and Hardee on the right.  Gen. Hooker’s blue-coats (XX Corps) strike the Confederate line in the center, and loses heavily against well-positioned artillery and the Rebel infantry who have an unobstructed field of fire.  Hooker disengages and pull back.  Some Union soldiers describe it as some of the most intense musketry of the war.





"Fighting Joe" Hooker lived up to his name and went fast and hard at the Confederates under General John Bell Hood. Hooker had hoped to catch the Rebels off guard and press home and advantage. Hood had other ideas. Taking his cue from his cavalry screen, Hood had begun entrenchments and selecting defensive positions. Advancing with his three divisions in parallel routes, Hooker pushed the Confederates back for three miles, before coming to Johnston's main line. The first of Hooker's assaults led by Brigadier General John W. Geary was thrown back when it encountered an undetected enfilade Confederate position which hit them hard. Hooker persisted with two more Divisions and the battle was enjoined.



Hood's middle was held by Major General Alexander P Stewart's Division and they bore the brunt of Hooker's onslaught for several hours in the afternoon. Difficult terrain prevented Hooker from coordinating his corps' attacks effectively, causing his men to suffer severe casualties, especially from canister and shrapnel. The battle raged with such ferocity that Johnston became worried that Stewart might relinquish the position. Stewart, a Tennessean, held firm even though some of Hooker's men got close. With a fierce thunderstorm brewing and setting in, Hooker made one last throw of the dice and pulled Geary out of reserve through dense wood to push through a perceived advantage. Stewart's artillery which had been so effective now opened up with even more canister rounds and caused the veteran Geary to claim that it was the hottest he had experienced with his command. The Union forces were praised for the courage and coolness, but the day was not to be theirs. With the drenching from the rain and the gloom of the stormy evening setting in, the Union forces settled down in their positions and awaited daylight. The battle has been called New Hope Church, but the soldiers knew it by "Hell's Hole."



The New Hope Church battlefield is today privately owned and located at the intersection of Bobo Road and Hwy 381 (Dallas Acworth Hwy) in Dallas.



John Wadsworth Vodrey, son of noted American potter Jabez Vodrey, was killed in the battle while serving with the 46th Pennsylvania Infantry. Deeper Dive Jabez Vodrey



On May 26, both sides entrenched at the battlefield of New Hope Church, and skirmishing continued throughout the day. At the end of the battle, Confederate Captain Samuel T. Foster reported that 703 Union soldiers had been killed, as well as 350 had been taken prisoner. The next day, the Union army concentrated its efforts in this area towards the northern end of the Confederate line, resulting in the Battle of Pickett's Mill. 


New Confederate monument at New Hope site.



All four sides new monument dedicated 2014.



Aftermath


Confederate field fortifications


Breastwork


New Hope Church battlefield photographs

Johnston and Hood both commended Stewart for his successful defense. On the other hand, Sherman was badly disappointed that his maneuver was so unexpectedly blocked. Sherman hated Hooker and unfairly criticized him for not immediately pushing ahead with Geary's division. Sherman believed that by waiting for his other two divisions to arrive, Hooker allowed the Confederates time to entrench. He hoped that he was only facing Hood's corps, but it was finally beginning to dawn on him that Johnston's entire army was in front of him. The sound of fighting was heard in Atlanta and caused a minor panic among the civilians there.



During the night, the Union army entrenched, and skirmishing continued throughout May 26. McPherson's wing and Davis' division occupied Dallas in the afternoon and established a position two miles farther east. The troops of Thomas and Schofield concentrated near New Hope Church. A one mile gap existed between Thomas and McPherson, but it was concealed by the heavily wooded terrain. Likewise, there was a gap between Hardee's corps east of Dallas and the corps of Hood and Polk at New Hope Church. Johnston detached Patrick Cleburne's division from Hardee and added it to his right flank. Thwarted in his attempt to turn the Confederate left flank, Sherman decided to attack the Confederate right flank. His efforts resulted in the Battle of Pickett's Mill on May 27.

Battlefield

Much of the New Hope Church battlefield is today privately owned and is located at the intersection of Bobo Road and Hwy 381 (Dallas Acworth Hwy) in Dallas. The Civil War Trust, a division of the American Battlefield Trust, and its partners have acquired and preserved five acres of the battlefield.



On May 26, both sides entrenched at the battlefield of New Hope Church, and skirmishing continued throughout the day. At the end of the battle, Confederate Captain Samuel T. Foster reported that 703 Union soldiers had been killed, as well as 350 had been taken prisoner. The next day, the Union army concentrated its efforts in this area towards the northern end of the Confederate line, resulting in the Battle of Pickett's Mill.



Pickett's Mill

I got a Message Too Large so I shifted the third day of Paulding County carnage, the Battle of Dallas, to a new post. Let's see if I can squeeze in the details of the second day of battles in Paulding County. The Battle of Pickett's Mill was fought on May 27, 1864, in Paulding County, Georgia, during the American Civil War between Union and Confederate forces. Union Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman attempted an attack on the right flank of Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.

Battle


Map of Pickett's Mill Battlefield core and study areas by the American Battlefield Protection Program.

After the Union defeat at New Hope Church, Sherman ordered Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard to attack Johnston's seemingly exposed right flank. The Confederates were ready for the attack, which did not unfold as planned because supporting troops never appeared. The Confederates repulsed the attack causing high casualties.


Operations near New Hope Church map is from Jacob D. Cox's Atlanta. Dallas is located at the lower left.

Thomas brought forward Howard's IV Corps, which deployed on the left of Hooker's corps and was in position by the morning of May 26. Davis' division moved forward on the left of McPherson's two corps. Of Palmer's other two XIV Corps divisions, Absalom Baird's remained at Burnt Hickory to guard Thomas' wagon train and Richard W. Johnson's was retained as a reserve. McPherson occupied Dallas on the morning of May 26 and pressed forward 2 miles until his troops were in contact with Hardee's corps. McPherson posted Davis' division on his left, Dodge's XVI Corps in the center, and Logan's XV Corps on his right. Garrard's horsemen watched the country to the right and skirmished with Jackson's cavalry. Schofield's XXIII Corps came up behind Hooker's and Howard's corps, except for Alvin Peterson Hovey's division which was left to guard the corps trains. Sherman ordered Schofield's corps to move to Brown's saw-mill on Little Pumkinvine Creek which was on Howard's left. After marching northeast through dense forest to reach Howard's left, both the XXIII Corps and IV Corps performed a right wheel in order to come face-to-face with the Confederate defenses. During May 26, both sides entrenched and there was continuous skirmishing all along the front lines.



Thwarted in his attempt to move around Johnston's left flank, Sherman decided to turn the Confederate right flank. He also wanted to extend his left flank until he reconnected with the railroad near Allatoona Pass. Conscious of his numerical superiority, Sherman knew he could hold his entrenchments with part of his forces while using another part for a flanking maneuver. On May 27, he ordered Thomas to pull Thomas J. Wood's division from Howard's corps and use it to turn Johnston's right flank. Wood would be supported by Johnson's division (XIV Corps) and Nathaniel McLean's brigade of XXIII Corps. On Sherman's left flank, McCook's cavalry clashed with Wheeler's cavalry, inflicting losses and capturing about 50 Confederates. Reports of this action led Sherman to believe that Johnston's right flank was only held by Wheeler's horsemen.



When Thomas and Howard examined the place selected for Wood's attack, they found that it was an open field exposed to crossfire. Thomas ordered Wood to march farther to the left. Accompanied by Howard, Wood's division deployed into six lines, one behind the other, and moved 1.5 miles through densely wooded terrain. Johnson's division was in a similar formation to Wood's left. Finding that there were Confederate entrenchments opposite Wood's division, Howard ordered the march to continue.



Unknown to the Federals, Johnston anticipated Sherman's maneuver and detached Cleburne's division from Hardee's corps, moving it to the right flank of Hood's corps. Johnston also ordered Stewart's division to be pulled out of the line and sent to the right flank to help Cleburne. Wood's division marched an additional 1 mile through dense forests and Howard ordered it to attack. At 5 pm, Wood sent William B. Hazen's brigade forward, but it was repulsed by Hiram B. Granbury's Texas brigade after bitter fighting. Belatedly, Wood sent in a second and finally a third brigade, but they also were beaten. Weakly supported on the left by Johnson's division and on the right by McLean's brigade, Wood's attack failed and the Battle of Pickett's Mill was a Union defeat. Federal casualties numbered 1,600, including an unusually high proportion of dead. The Confederates reported 448 casualties.



Battlefield

The address of Pickett's Mill Battlefield Historic Site is 4432 Mt. Tabor Church Rd, Dallas, Georgia 30157. It is now preserved as a Georgia state park and includes roads used by Union and Confederate troops, earthwork battlements, and an 1800s era pioneer cabin.



The area's ravine is a site where hundreds died.



TRD Explorations And Official Reports

Battle of Pickett's Mill 

Author Ambrose Bierce fought for the Union at Pickett's Mill as a topographical engineer under William Babcock Hazen. Bierce's short story "The Crime at Pickett's Mill" is about this battle.



Bierce reported that the battle took about 45 minutes; that the total loss was 1,400 men; one-half were killed and wounded in Hazen's brigade in 30 minutes of actual fighting.



There is a class of events which by their very nature, and despite any intrinsic interest that they may possess, are foredoomed to oblivion. They are merged in the general story of those greater events of which they were a part, as the thunder of a billow breaking on a distant beach is unnoted in the continuous roar. To how many having knowledge of the battles of our Civil War does the name Pickett's Mill suggest acts of heroism and devotion performed in scenes of awful carnage to accomplish the impossible? Buried in the official reports of the victors there are indeed imperfect accounts of the engagement: the vanquished have not thought it expedient to relate it. It is ignored by General Sherman in his memoirs, yet Sherman ordered it. General Howard wrote an account of the campaign of which it was an incident, and dismissed it in a single sentence; yet General Howard planned it, and it was fought as an isolated and independent action under his eye. Whether it was so trifling an affair as to justify this inattention let the reader judge.



The fight occurred on the 27th of May, 1864, while the armies of Generals Sherman and Johnston confronted each other near Dallas, Georgia, during the memorable "Atlanta campaign." For three weeks we had been pushing the Confederates southward, partly by manoeuvring, partly by fighting, out of Dalton, out of Resaca, through Adairsville, Kingston and Cassville. Each army offered battle everywhere, but would accept it only on its own terms. At Dallas Johnston made another stand and Sherman, facing the hostile line, began his customary manoeuvring for an advantage. General Wood's division of Howard's corps occupied a position opposite the Confederate right. Johnston finding himself on the 26th overlapped by Schofield, still farther to Wood's left, retired his right (Polk) across a creek, whither we followed him into the woods with a deal of desultory bickering, and at nightfall had established the new lines at nearly a right angle with the old - Schofield reaching well around and threatening the Confederate rear.


Portion of Pickett's Mill battlefield as it appears today.

The civilian reader must not suppose when he reads accounts of military operations in which relative positions of the forces are defined, as in the foregoing passages, that these were matters of general knowledge to those engaged. Such statements are commonly made, even by those high in command, in the light of later disclosures, such as the enemy's official reports. It is seldom, indeed, that a subordinate officer knows anything about the disposition of the enemy's forces - except that it is unamiable - or precisely whom he is fighting. As to the rank and file, they can know nothing more of the matter than the arms they carry. They hardly know what troops are upon their own right or left the length of a regiment away. If it is a cloudy day they are ignorant even of the points of the compass. It may be said, generally, that a soldier's knowledge of what is going on about him is coterminous with his official relation to it and his personal connection with it; what is going on in front of him he does not know at all until he learns it afterward.



At nine o'clock on the morning of the 27th Wood's division was withdrawn and replaced by Stanley's. Supported by Johnson's division, it moved at ten o'clock to the left, in the rear of Schofield, a distance of four miles through a forest, and at two o'clock in the afternoon had reached a position where General Howard believed himself free to move in behind the enemy's forces and attack them in the rear, or at least, striking them in the flank, crush his way along their line in the direction of its length, throw them into confusion and prepare an easy victory for a supporting attack in front. In selecting General Howard for this bold adventure General Sherman was doubtless not unmindful of Chancellorsville, where Stonewall Jackson had executed a similar manoeuvre for Howard's instruction. Experience is a normal school: it teaches how to teach.



There are some differences to be noted. At Chancellorsville it was Jackson who attacked; at Pickett's Mill, Howard. At Chancellorsville it was Howard who was assailed; at Pickett's Mill, Hood. The significance of the first distinction is doubled by that of the second.



The attack, it was understood, was to be made in column of brigades, Hazen's brigade of Wood's division leading. That such was at least Hazen's understanding I learned from his own lips during the movement, as I was an officer of his staff. But after a march of less than a mile an hour and a further delay of three hours at the end of it to acquaint the enemy of our intention to surprise him, our single shrunken brigade of fifteen hundred men was sent forward without support to double up the army of General Johnston. "We will put in Hazen and see what success he has." In these words of General Wood to General Howard we were first apprised of the true nature of the distinction about to be conferred upon us.



General W.B. Hazen, a born fighter, an educated soldier, after the war Chief Signal Officer of the Army and now long dead, was the best hated man that I ever knew, and his very memory is a terror to every unworthy soul in the service. His was a stormy life: he was in trouble all round. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and a countless multitude of the less eminent luckless had the misfortune, at one time and another, to incur his disfavor, and he tried to punish them all. He was always - after the war - the central figure of a court-martial or a Congressional inquiry, was accused of everything, from stealing to cowardice, was banished to obscure posts, "jumped on" by the press, traduced in public and in private, and always emerged triumphant. While Signal Officer, he went up against the Secretary of War and put him to the controversial sword. He convicted Sheridan of falsehood, Sherman of barbarism, Grant of inefficiency. He was aggressive, arrogant, tyrannical, honorable, truthful, courageous - skillful soldier, a faithful friend and one of the most exasperating of men. Duty was his religion, and like the Moslem he proselyted with the sword. His missionary efforts were directed chiefly against the spiritual darkness of his superiors in rank, though he would turn aside from pursuit of his erring commander to set a chicken-thieving orderly astride a wooden horse, with a heavy stone attached to each foot. "Hazen," said a brother brigadier, "is a synonym of insubordination." For my commander and my friend, my master in the art of war, now unable to answer for himself, let this fact answer: when he heard Wood say they would put him in and see what success he would have in defeating an army - when he saw Howard assent - he uttered never a word, rode to the head of his feeble brigade and patiently awaited the command to go. Only by a look which I knew how to read did he betray his sense of the criminal blunder.



The enemy had now had seven hours in which to learn of the movement and prepare to meet it. General Johnston says:

"The Federal troops extended their intrenched line [we did not intrench] so rapidly to their left that it was found necessary to transfer Cleburne's division to Hardee's corps to our right, where it was formed on the prolongation of Polk's line."



General Hood, commanding the enemy's right corps, says:

"On the morning of the 27th the enemy were known to be rapidly extending their left, attempting to turn my right as they extended. Cleburne was deployed to meet them, and at half-past five P.M. a very stubborn attack was made on this division, extending to the right, where Major-General Wheeler with his cavalry division was engaging them. The assault was continued with great determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler."



That, then, was the situation: a weak brigade of fifteen hundred men, with masses of idle troops behind in the character of audience, waiting for the word to march a quarter-mile uphill through almost impassable tangles of underwood, along and across precipitous ravines, and attack breastworks constructed at leisure and manned with two divisions of troops as good as themselves. True, we did not know all this, but if any man on that ground besides Wood and Howard expected a "walkover" his must have been a singularly hopeful disposition. As topographical engineer it had been my duty to make a hasty examination of the ground in front. In doing so I had pushed far enough forward through the forest to hear distinctly the murmur of the enemy awaiting us, and this had been duly reported; but from our lines nothing could be heard but the wind among the trees and the songs of birds. Someone said it was a pity to frighten them, but there would necessarily be more or less noise. We laughed at that: men awaiting death on the battlefield laugh easily, though not infectiously.



The brigade was formed in four battalions, two in front and two in rear. This gave us a front of about two hundred yards. The right front battalion was commanded by Colonel R.L. Kimberly of the 41st Ohio, the left by Colonel O.H. Payne of the 124th Ohio, the rear battalions by Colonel J.C. Foy, 23d Kentucky, and Colonel W.W. Berry, 5th Kentucky - all brave and skillful officers, tested by experience on many fields. The whole command (known as the Second Brigade, Third Division, Fourth Corps) consisted of no fewer than nine regiments, reduced by long service to an average of less than two hundred men each. With full ranks and only the necessary details for special duty we should have had some eight thousand rifles in line.



We moved forward. In less than one minute the trim battalions had become simply a swarm of men struggling through the undergrowth of the forest, pushing and crowding. The front was irregularly serrated, the strongest and bravest in advance, the others following in fan-like formations, variable and inconstant, ever defining themselves anew. For the first two hundred yards our course lay along the left bank of a small creek in a deep ravine, our left battalions sweeping along its steep slope. Then we came to the fork of the ravine. A part of us crossed below, the rest above, passing over both branches, the regiments inextricably intermingled, rendering all military formation impossible. The color-bearers kept well to the front with their flags, closely furled, aslant backward over their shoulders. Displayed, they would have been torn to rags by the boughs of the trees. Horses were all sent to the rear; the general and staff and all the field officers toiled along on foot as best they could. "We shall halt and form when we get out of this," said an aide-de-camp.



Suddenly there were a ringing rattle of musketry, the familiar hissing of bullets, and before us the interspaces of the forest were all blue with smoke. Hoarse, fierce yells broke out of a thousand throats. The forward fringe of brave and hardy assailants was arrested in its mutable extensions; the edge of our swarm grew dense and clearly defined as the foremost halted, and the rest pressed forward to align themselves beside them, all firing. The uproar was deafening; the air was sibilant with streams and sheets of missiles. In the steady, unvarying roar of small-arms the frequent shock of the cannon was rather felt than heard, but the gusts of grape which they blew into that populous wood were audible enough, screaming among the trees and cracking against their stems and branches. We had, of course, no artillery to reply.



This print of the Battle of Pickett's Mill depicts the first volley from Granbury's Texas Brigade into the advancing troops of Gen. William B. Hazen. Hundreds of union soldiers were cut down from less than 20 paces away. One half of Hazen's brigade became casualties in less than 30 minutes of fighting.


Site of Pickett's Mill.

Our brave color-bearers were now all in the forefront of battle in the open, for the enemy had cleared a space in front of his breastworks. They held the colors erect, shook out their glories, waved them forward and back to keep them spread, for there was no wind. From where I stood, at the right of the line - we had "halted and formed," indeed - I could see six of our flags at one time. Occasionally one would go down, only to be instantly lifted by other hands.



I must here quote again from General Johnston's account of this engagement, for nothing could more truly indicate the resolute nature of the attack than the Confederate belief that it was made by the whole Fourth Corps, instead of one weak brigade:

"The Fourth Corps came on in deep order and assailed the Texans with great vigor, receiving their close and accurate fire with the fortitude always exhibited by General Sherman's troops in the actions of this campaign…. The Federal troops approached within a few yards of the Confederates, but at last were forced to give way by their storm of well-directed bullets, and fell back to the shelter of a hollow near and behind them. They left hundreds of corpses within twenty paces of the Confederate line. When the United States troops paused in their advance within fifteen paces of the Texan front rank one of their color-bearers planted his colors eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, and was instantly shot dead. A soldier sprang forward to his place and fell also as he grasped the color-staff. A second and third followed successively, and each received death as speedily as his predecessors. A fourth, however, seized and bore back the object of soldierly devotion."



Such incidents have occurred in battle from time to time since men began to venerate the symbols of their cause, but they are not commonly related by the enemy. If General Johnston had known that his veteran divisions were throwing their successive lines against fewer than fifteen hundred men his glowing tribute to his enemy's valor could hardly have been more generously expressed. I can attest the truth of his soldierly praise: I saw the occurrence that he relates and regret that I am unable to recall even the name of the regiment whose colors were so gallantly saved.



Early in my military experience I used to ask myself how it was that brave troops could retreat while still their courage was high. As long as a man is not disabled he can go forward; can it be anything but fear that makes him stop and finally retire? Are there signs by which he can infallibly know the struggle to be hopeless? In this engagement, as in others, my doubts were answered as to the fact; the explanation is still obscure. In many instances which have come under my observation, when hostile lines of infantry engage at close range and the assailants afterward retire, there was a "dead-line" beyond which no man advanced but to fall. Not a soul of them ever reached the enemy's front to be bayoneted or captured. It was a matter of the difference of three or four paces - too small a distance to affect the accuracy of aim. In these affairs no aim is taken at individual antagonists; the soldier delivers his fire at the thickest mass in his front. The fire is, of course, as deadly at twenty paces as at fifteen; at fifteen as at ten. Nevertheless, there is the "dead-line," with its well-defined edge of corpses - those of the bravest. Where both lines are fighting without cover - as in a charge met by a counter-charge - each has its "dead-line," and between the two is a clear space - neutral ground, devoid of dead, for the living cannot reach it to fall there.



I observed this phenomenon at Pickett's Mill. Standing at the right of the line I had an unobstructed view of the narrow, open space across which the two lines fought. It was dim with smoke, but not greatly obscured: the smoke rose and spread in sheets among the branches of the trees. Most of our men fought kneeling as they fired, many of them behind trees, stones and whatever cover they could get, but there were considerable groups that stood. Occasionally one of these groups, which had endured the storm of missiles for moments without perceptible reduction, would push forward, moved by a common despair, and wholly detach itself from the line. In a second every man of the group would be down. There had been no visible movement of the enemy, no audible change in the awful, even roar of the firing - yet all were down. Frequently the dim figure of an individual soldier would be seen to spring away from his comrades, advancing alone toward that fateful interspace, with leveled bayonet. He got no farther than the farthest of his predecessors. Of the "hundreds of corpses within twenty paces of the Confederate line," I venture to say that a third were within fifteen paces, and not one within ten.



It is the perception - perhaps unconscious - of this inexplicable phenomenon that causes the still unharmed, still vigorous and still courageous soldier to retire without having come into actual contact with his foe. He sees, or feels, that he cannot. His bayonet is a useless weapon for slaughter; its purpose is a moral one. Its mandate exhausted, he sheathes it and trusts to the bullet. That failing, he retreats. He has done all that he could do with such appliances as he has.


Pickett's Mill School project.
 
No command to fall back was given, none could have been heard. Man by man, the survivors withdrew at will, sifting through the trees into the cover of the ravines, among the wounded who could drag themselves back; among the skulkers whom nothing could have dragged forward. The left of our short line had fought at the corner of a cornfield, the fence along the right side of which was parallel to the direction of our retreat. As the disorganized groups fell back along this fence on the wooded side, they were attacked by a flanking force of the enemy moving through the field in a direction nearly parallel with what had been our front.



This force, I infer from General Johnston's account, consisted of the brigade of General Lowry, or two Arkansas regiments under Colonel Baucum. I had been sent by General Hazen to that point and arrived in time to witness this formidable movement. But already our retreating men, in obedience to their officers, their courage and their instinct of self-preservation, had formed along the fence and opened fire. The apparently slight advantage of the imperfect cover and the open range worked its customary miracle: the assault, a singularly spiritless one, considering the advantages it promised and that it was made by an organized and victorious force against a broken and retreating one, was checked. The assailants actually retired, and if they afterward renewed the movement they encountered none but our dead and wounded.



The battle, as a battle, was at an end, but there was still some slaughtering that it was possible to incur before nightfall; and as the wreck of our brigade drifted back through the forest we met the brigade (Gibson's) which, had the attack been made in column, as it should have been, would have been but five minutes behind our heels, with another five minutes behind its own. As it was, just forty-five minutes had elapsed, during which the enemy had destroyed us and was now ready to perform the same kindly office for our successors. Neither Gibson nor the brigade which was sent to his "relief" as tardily as he to ours accomplished, or could have hoped to accomplish, anything whatever. I did not note their movements, having other duties, but Hazen in his "Narrative of Military Service" says:

"I witnessed the attack of the two brigades following my own, and none of these (troops) advanced nearer than one hundred yards of the enemy's works. They went in at a run, and as organizations were broken in less than a minute."


Different Historical Marker - Same text as above marker.

Nevertheless their losses were considerable, including several hundred prisoners taken from a sheltered place whence they did not care to rise and run. The entire loss was about fourteen hundred men, of whom nearly one-half fell killed and wounded in Hazen's brigade in less than thirty minutes of actual fighting.

General Johnston says:

"The Federal dead lying near our line were counted by many persons, officers and soldiers. According to these counts there were seven hundred of them."



This is obviously erroneous, though I have not the means at hand to ascertain the true number. I remember that we were all astonished at the uncommonly large proportion of dead to wounded - a consequence of the uncommonly close range at which most of the fighting was done.


Actual Mill.

The action took its name from a water-power mill nearby. This was on a branch of a stream having, I am sorry to say, the prosaic name of Pumpkin Vine Creek. I have my own reasons for suggesting that the name of that water-course be altered to Sunday-School Run.

OK I am searching for another Paulding County Natural Wonder so I can finish my Pauldng County History tangent on the Battle of Dallas and Paulding County since the Civil War. I am wanting to explore the Pumkinvine Creek Gorge. Today's Georgia Natural Wonder Gals posed a tricky source of inspiration so with Paulding County, I settled on St. Pauli Girls.